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The evolutionary conundrum
presented by cooperative
behavior is well known.
Cooperative traits are costly to
express and are thus open to
exploitation. Selfish individuals
can defect from cooperation and
benefit from the social
contributions of others without
reciprocating themselves. Such
‘cheaters’ can thus threaten the
stability of cooperative systems.
Selfish social strategies are not
limited to mammals with complex
behavioral plasticity, such as
ourselves [1]. Cheating is also
common in social insects and in
microbes with relatively hard-
wired social traits. For example,
some insect queens, known as
social parasites, steal workers
from the colonies of other queens
and use them to raise their own
offspring [2]. In bacteria, selfish
individuals can cheat by failing to
make beneficial extra-cellular
compounds that are produced by
cooperative neighbors [3].
Yet despite the common
occurrence of cheating,
cooperative systems such as
genomes, multi-cellular organisms
and animal societies have
succeeded many times
throughout evolutionary history.
Such cooperative success
requires mechanisms that limit the
frequency and/or intensity of
selfish behavior [4]. In the
absence of restraint, cheaters
destabilize cooperation and can
even cause whole populations to
go extinct when cooperation is
required for survival [5]. How then
is cheating restrained?
Previous studies of cheater
limitation have focused primarily
on social interactions among
individuals and natural selection
acting on kin networks [6] and
spatial groups [7]. For example,
cooperation might be promoted
by preferential cooperation with
kin [6,8], behavioral reciprocity
(where cooperative and selfish
acts are returned in kind) [9],
policing (where cheaters are
recognized and punished) [10] or
purifying colonization (where only
cooperators found new social
groups) [11].
It has recently been proposed
that cheating might also be
restrained at the genetic level
within potential cheats
themselves [11,12]. The
complexity of gene–trait
relationships presents the
opportunity to genetically short-
circuit the appearance of
successful cheaters. The most
direct way to accomplish this
would be to make mutations that
cause defection from cooperation
intrinsically harmful to fitness
(‘intrinsic defector inferiority’) [11].
Such fruitless defection could be
accomplished by linkage of a
gene for a costly cooperative trait
to a distinct trait important to
evolutionary fitness.
Recent work by Foster et al.
[12] on a defector mutant of the
cooperative slime mold
Dictyostelium discoideum has
revealed an interesting case of a
pleiotropic linkage that causes
defector inferiority. D. discoideum
is well known for its ability to
undergo social development
during starvation to form
both. For instance, an ant might
first walk just beyond the fork
being sure to turn through a small
angle to do so, and then turn in
the opposite direction to measure
its angle with respect to the
remaining branch. If that angle is
small the ant is heading away
from the nest and if it is large the
ant is going home.
In whatever way the
measurement is made, it requires
some effort, raising the question:
under what conditions do ants
bother to assess the geometry of
a fork? Do they do it at every fork
that they notice, or only when they
are in a state of uncertainty, after
joining a trail, or when they are
confused after interacting with
other ants that they meet on a
busy trail? Testing ants
individually on more complex
artificial trails, which contain
several forks with opposite
polarities, may give an answer. 
Meanwhile, the current findings
of Jackson et al. [2] give an
intriguing glimpse into the
sophisticated decision-making of
individual Pharoah’s ants. The
arthropod mental toolkit appears
to comprise an amazing array of
special purpose devices that
operate automatically in particular
behavioural circumstances.
Although the adaptive decision
making of ants often depends on
group interactions, the behaviour
of Pharaoh’s ants stresses that
social intelligence is underpinned
by smart individual behaviour.
This leaves us with a final
question. By what mechanism are
the 60° forks formed? Are they the
result of a directional decision
made by an individual ant when it
first leaves a trail to make a new
branch, or do the forks become
increasingly well formed when
travelled by many ants?
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Evolution of Cooperation: Does
Selfishness Restraint Lie within?
Traditional models of how cooperative strategies succeed in evolution
have largely focused on social interactions among individuals and
selection acting at kin and group levels. A recent study at the genetic
level suggests that cooperation may also be promoted by the evolution
of gene–trait relationships that limit the range of possible cheating
mechanisms that can evolve.
multicellular fruiting bodies.
During this process, 20% of
aggregating cells serve to
physically construct a stalk that
will bear the remaining 80% of
cells that differentiate into stress-
resistant spores. Stalk- and
spore-cell fates are preceded by
physiologically distinct pre-stalk
and pre-spore stages. Because
stalk cells die, D. discoideum
development creates a forum for
genetic conflict if distinct
genotypes coexist within a single
fruiting structure. Genotypes able
to defect from proportional
contribution to the stalk-cell
population should, in principle, be
over-represented among spores
and increase in frequency relative
to genotypes that contribute
relatively more to stalk
construction.
Foster et al. [12] have identified a
mutational strategy that, at first
glance, appears to be a fruitful
path to successful cheating.
Differentiation of half of the pre-
stalk cells into stalk cells is
effected by the signaling molecule
DIF-1, which is secreted by
proximate pre-spore cells. Foster
et al. [12] reasoned that mutants
insensitive to DIF-1 will make fewer
stalk cells and should thus become
disproportionately over-
represented among spores in
chimeric mixtures with ‘altruistic’
cells that remain sensitive to DIF-1.
The dimA locus encodes a
central component in the DIF-1
response pathway, and consistent
with expectations, Foster et al.
[12] found that dimA– mutants
preferentially enter the pre-spore
region of cell aggregates over the
pre-stalk area. In chimeras with an
initial 50:50 ratio of wild-type to
dimA— cells, the cell-type ratio
within the pre-spore cell
population became 34:66. At this
stage, the dimA– pre-spore cells
appeared to lack any major
defects in cell motility or other
traits that might compromise their
ability to convert into mature
spores and thereby win the
competition for limited spore slots
over wild-type cells.
But superior access to the pre-
spore stage of D. discoideum
development turned out to be a
misleading sign of cheating. When
they counted the relative number
of both cell types among mature
spores, Foster et al. [12] found
that the dimA– mutants lost the
numerical dominance they had
exhibited in the pre-spore stage.
Not only had the prospective
cheats lost majority status during
spore differentiation, but they were
actually under-represented by a
factor of two among mature
spores relative to pre-spores
(65:35 wild-type:dimA- spore ratio).
In clonal wild-type
development, nearly all pre-stalk
cells in D. discoideum end up in
the stalk, with very little trans-
differentiation between the pre-
spore and pre-stalk cell fates. In
contrast, in wild-type:dimA–
chimeras, a large number of wild-
type pre-stalk cells appear to
switch fate and in the process
exclude most dimA– cells from
final spore differentiation. Thus,
dimA– defection from pre-stalk
contribution is fruitless in the end
because of the pleiotropic
exclusion of dimA– pre-spore cells
from the final spore-cell fate.
How generally important is
intrinsic defector inferiority,
pleiotropy in particular, for the
stabilization of cooperation? While
a complete answer is distant,
initial insight can be gleaned from
previous observations of fruitful
and fruitless defection in
microbes. First, the ease of
obtaining cheaters by a single
mutation or a few mutations
[3,13–17] suggests that a
significant percentage of loci
determining cooperation versus
defection are not subject to
defector-inferiority constraints, at
least in microbes. If many
defection mutations result in
successful cheating, then higher
levels of cheater control will be
important for the evolutionary
success of cooperation.
Nonetheless, fitness inferiority
has been observed in a number of
microbial defectors. Several
mutants of the social bacterium
Myxococcus xanthus that defect
from signal contribution during
social development are inferior
social competitors [16,18].
Similarly, a D. discoideum
defector from extra-cellular
adhesin production suffers from
its asocial strategy by losing
access to fruiting aggregates [19].
In the gut bacterium Escherichia
coli, defector inferiority is
accomplished by the physical
linkage of one gene controlling a
social contribution to a second
gene important for survival [11].
Many strains of E. coli carry a
plasmid that contains a colicin
gene for killing sensitive
competitors [20]. Defection from
colicin contribution could occur
via plasmid loss. However, colicin
plasmids also carry the gene
necessary for resistance to the
toxin. Would-be cheaters that
defect by plasmid loss are
automatically killed by non-
defecting neighbors as a result of
the physical linkage of the colicin
and resistance genes.
If a social organism has
evolved so that most defection
mutations directly result in short-
term fitness inferiority, it will be
less dependent on mechanisms
of cheater restraint that operate
via social interactions or
selection above the individual
level. Foster et al. [12] propose
that defector inferiority may be
very common due to the ubiquity
of pleiotropic gene effects. The
ease of finding both cheating and
non-successful defector mutants
in microbial systems suggests
that defector inferiority may be
an important, but limited,
mechanism for constraining the
presence of cheats.
Functional genomic studies will
increasingly reveal the number
and type of social contribution
genes in a variety of social
organisms and will allow thorough
examination of the frequency with
which cheating is genetically
nipped in the bud. Beyond that
lies the more daunting challenge
of understanding the molecular
origins of pleiotropic linkages that
cause defector inferiority. Once
such linkages arise, groups of
social organisms bearing them will
be at an advantage over groups of
individuals in which cheating can
more readily evolve.
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The Hedgehog (Hh) protein and its
relatives mediate cell–cell
communication in a wide variety of
developmental contexts. Important
details are still being learned about
the mechanism by which the Hh
signal is transduced in receiving
cells. This is well illustrated by two
recent papers [1,2] which report an
unexpected connection between
the signal transduction
mechanisms used by Hedgehog
(Hh) proteins and by G protein
coupled receptors. Smoothened
(Smo), the key cell-surface
transducer of Hh signals, shares a
seven transmembrane domain
topology with G protein coupled
receptors and has therefore long
been suspected to signal by
coupling to trimeric G-proteins [3].
Although this suspicion has neither
been proven nor dismissed, it now
seems possible that another
aspect of G protein coupled
receptor biochemistry, namely
phosphorylation-dependent
binding to Arrestin, may be
fundamental to Smo activity.
Arrestin binding to prototypical
G protein coupled receptors, such
as rhodopsin or β2 adrenergic
receptors, is dependent on both
an agonist dependent change in G
protein coupled receptor
conformation and phosphorylation
of the receptor on multiple serine
or threonine residues by a G
protein coupled receptor kinase
(GRK) [4]. Arrestin binding can
have several consequences. Most
importantly it blocks signaling by
impeding access of G-proteins to
the activated receptor. Arrestin
binding also induces clathrin-
mediated receptor internalization,
leading either to receptor
dephosphorylation and recycling
or to receptor destruction in
lysosomes. Finally, G protein
coupled receptor-bound Arrestin
can recruit additional proteins to
membranes, thereby initiating
additional signal transduction
pathways, as shown most clearly
for mitogen activated protein
(MAP) kinase pathways.
Very little can be said with
certainty about the biochemistry of
Smo in the Hh signaling pathway
(Figure 1). Smo is not activated
directly by Hh [3]. Rather, Smo is
inhibited indirectly by Patched
(Ptc), and this inhibition is relieved
by binding of Hh to Ptc. Ptc is a 12
transmembrane domain protein,
related both to bacterial proteins
that transport small molecules
across membranes and to
molecules that regulate vesicle
traffic [5]. Smo can be inhibited or
activated by specific small
cholesterol based compounds [6],
and segregates into Ptc-free
endosomes in response to Hh,
thereby escaping lysosomal
degradation [7]. Hence, it is
conjectured that Smo activity is
regulated by small intracellular
ligands, its subcellular distribution
or both.
Evidence for G-proteins as Smo
effectors comes from studies
showing an ability of Smo to
couple to Gi in a heterologous
system and by the production of a
subset of Sonic hedgehog (Shh)
loss-of-function phenotypes in
zebrafish by pertussis toxin
inhibition of Gi [3]. However,
genetic modification of G protein
activities, tested most extensively
in Drosophila tissue culture cells,
has not so far been found to alter
Hh signaling [8]. The physical
interaction of Smo with Cubitus
interruptus (Ci), the transcriptional
effector of the Hh pathway, via the
kinesin-related protein Costal 2
provides a plausible alternative to
G protein mediated signaling in
Drosophila [9]. Furthermore, a
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Hedgehog Signaling: An Arrestin
Connection?
Arrestins are best known for terminating signaling by G protein
coupled receptors. New binding, localization and genetic studies
suggest that Arrestins may also participate in the transduction of
Hedgehog signals by the seven transmembrane domain protein,
Smoothened.
